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A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SWEDEN:
BALANCING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY

by

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Preface

The idea to do this research topic came from when I was involved with long-term capability planning for the Swedish Air Force. As in most countries, the strategic debate got a bit off track after the end of the Cold War. I, as a junior officer, had many questions on my mind. The traditional Swedish neutrality policy had already given way to a non-alignment policy in peacetime but with increasing Swedish involvement in multi-national peacekeeping operations in the 1990's, Sweden had to cooperate closely with NATO. When Russia joined the Partnership for Peace cooperation, what was left of Swedish non-alignment and how relevant was the non-alignment policy? Furthermore, how much should Sweden get involved in different types of international operations? To what end? Moreover, was there any requirement to defend Sweden militarily when European relations seemed to evolve in linear fashion, towards greater cooperation, stability and peace? However, Russia gradually adopted a more forceful foreign policy strategy, from the early 2000's, as its incomes rose from raw material exports and it did not seem impossible that history would repeat itself to some extent, with increasing tension in the North European region. In my mind, these questions needed answers before it was possible to adapt adequately the armed forces to fulfill new requirements. Many of the elements in Swedish strategic actions are sensible and prudent but the strategic debate is sometimes confused. This is because the arguments in the debate do not tie together Swedish actions with desired outcomes, development drivers, and patterns of change. The aim of this work was to clarify the reasons behind Swedish strategic actions to myself and to think about how those actions should respond

to future developments, departing from Swedish core national interests, and Sweden's strategic position. Sweden already does much of what the thesis suggests but some proposals are new. The main aim of the paper is to put Sweden's strategic action into a coherent whole.

My gratitude goes to Dr. Ackerman at ACSC for helping me shape my thoughts, to several senior Swedish military officers who challenged my conventional ways of thinking, to the members of the Swedish Royal War Science Academy who always stimulate strategic debates, and to the Swedish National Defense College for their fine education. In addition, the lecturers and seminar instructors of the ACSC have been very helpful and they have broadened my horizons in strategic matters even further.

Abstract

National security strategies should entail all instruments of power and not just the military. Furthermore, the strategy needs to identify both threats and opportunities. A national security strategy must consider the long-term if the state concerned shall stand any chance to take appropriate action and try to shape the environment in order to avoid or counter threats, mitigate undesired effects, and benefit from arising opportunities. Strategy development requires predictions of the future. A method well suited to strategy development is trend analysis. Trends are broad enough to capture all overarching patterns of change and do not include the degree of detail and speculation that scenario analysis can contain. Each trend consists of drivers and consequences. The role of strategy is to shape undesired drivers, support desired drivers, mitigate undesired consequences, and take advantage of desired consequences, in accordance with core national interests and the strategic situation of a particular country.

The paper begins by identifying four foundational trends: climate change, globalization, energy transformation, and global demographic change. It goes on to describe Swedish core national values and interests, and evaluates the Swedish strategic position in the world. Finally, it develops a suggestion for a Swedish national security strategy focusing on global, regional, and local actions. The paper illustrates a method for small states to develop a national security strategy.

A National Security Strategy for Sweden: Balancing Risks and Opportunities in the 21st Century

The conservative State can achieve its object by merely inducing the aggressor to drop his attempt at conquest-by convincing him that ‘the game is not worth the candle’.

— B.H. Liddell Hart¹

Introduction

Never has humanity combined so much power with so much disorder, so much anxiety with so many playthings, so much knowledge with so much uncertainty.

— Paul Valéry (1932)²

Colin Gray writes that, “[P]oor strategy is expensive, bad strategy can be lethal, while when the stakes include survival, very bad strategy is almost always fatal.”³ The aim of this paper is to suggest a national security strategy for Sweden, based on Swedish core values, its strategic position, and an analysis of what and how foundational trends affect the Northern European region. In order to do so, it attempts to answer a few necessary questions on the path. For instance, what is strategy in general and national security strategy in particular? Why do states need a national security strategy? What method is appropriate for strategy development? Finally, what is the relevance and general applicability of the findings in this paper?

Strategy is a process that ties desired ends to available means and describes, in broad terms, the preferred ways to apply the means. Strategy is thus normative. American strategists Dennis

M. Drew and Donald M. Snow write that, “Grand national strategy is the process by which the country’s basic goals are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values held by other states and non-state actors.”⁴ Sadly, it is all too common for writers to associate strategy with the military instrument of power only. German strategist Carl von Clausewitz viewed strategy as the organization of battles to achieve the political objectives of war.⁵ Likewise, former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger talks about national security as encompassing all instruments of power but when he discusses strategy, he only treats it in relation to military power.⁶ Finally, even strategist Colin Gray limits strategy to war and conflict in his contemporary writings.⁷ These narrow definitions of strategy arguably miss two important aspects of strategy: first, that strategy encompasses all national instruments of power and not just the military and second, that a national strategy is useful for taking advantage of opportunities and not only to manage emergencies. As this thesis illustrates, a more broadly defined concept of strategy, including all instruments of power, is much more useful for states in general but for small states like Sweden in particular. Simply put, strategy translates policy, determined in politics, into actions, taking into account the deep structure of the environment. Thus, a good strategy includes a statement of the ends that the state wants to accomplish, the ways it wants to utilize, and a realistic appreciation of available means.

The next question to answer is why states are in need of a national security strategy. In general, small states need well-developed strategies to avoid consequential risks and to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. There are two reasons for this. First, because the states in question are small, they cannot expect to shape the international context in accordance with their interest without careful preparation and because a lack of foresight can have much more negative impact on a small state compared to a more powerful state. Second,

the international context is dynamic and at times changes rapidly. Small states require adequate foresight to bring national resources together in a timely fashion to facilitate coherent action without unsettling the economic or social fabric of the state. While all states rely on sound long-term strategies to map out coherent action, strategy development is vital to small states. They do not possess national power significant enough to act as a safety net or buffer to actions that turn out to be counterproductive. Small states must in certain cases “get it right” from the start. In order to do that, they need to understand clearly the driving forces behind strategy and have a clear notion of what the state’s long-term goals are. The strategic objectives answer the fundamental question of what the state tries to obtain with its strategy. The strategy must be long-term in order to avoid economic and social disruption caused by rapid and unforeseen domestic or international changes. History has shown that actions need to be timely as well as relevant to the situation at hand. Thus, it is important for all states, but even more so for small states, to have relevant insight into developing future trends because these trends will ultimately constitute the new future.

There is ample empirical evidence of the link between a sound strategy and small states’ success or failure. The case of United Arab Emirates (UAE) serves as a good example. It is a small state that a decade ago was very dependent on oil exports and arguably still is. However, because it looked into long-term developments, the UAE realized that it would run out of oil sometime in the future. This enabled the country to recognize the need to diversify their economy in time.⁸

The third question to investigate is the method with which to develop a sound national security strategy. As mentioned before, the foundation for a national security strategy must be that particular state’s national interests. National interests mainly set the objectives and describe

the desired future, which in turn drive the ways and means of the strategy. National interests originate from the state's core values and are so important that most states do not willingly want to compromise on their national interests.⁹ National interests in this context are external in character, meaning that they describe relations between sovereign states and other relevant actors in the international system.¹⁰

The next important element in the strategy is the strategic position of the state in question. As such, this element of the strategy is a relative variable. It takes stock of national resources, geographic situation, and compares it to the power of other states in the region. To a high degree, this element shapes the ways of the strategy simply because a powerful state may logically use direct ways to further its interests while a small state has to make more use of indirect ways. The paper develops this concept further downstream.

The last element in strategy making is a description of the environment the strategy will confront. As established earlier, a good strategy must be long-term and consequently, its formulation requires a thorough understanding of what the future holds. However, it is a well-known fact that it is impossible to predict the future accurately. Since international and domestic environments are both linked and dynamic, it is not possible to devise a detailed, long-term strategy as a panacea to all circumstances. On the other hand, a strategy based on the recognition and understanding of fundamental long-term trends can incorporate and retain a vast amount of flexibility that lends it to constant adaption and calibration as a response to un-anticipated occurrences. The paper investigates global future trends that will affect Sweden strategically in the next 50 years or so, because that leads to an understanding of the risks and opportunities that confront Sweden. This in turn, makes it possible to map the strategic choices of small states, like Sweden, in an era when change in all likelihood eclipse continuity.¹¹

Moreover, the method described above is useful as a general conceptual approach to strategy making. Thus, method wise, the research holds general applicability to most states. The particular strategic suggestions for Sweden may in part be pertinent to other small states because the size of the state largely determines what ways and means are open for the strategy.

The thesis works through the three elements needed to devise strategy - foundational trends, national interests, and a strategic evaluation. It begins with an analysis and description of the major future global trends that potentially affect Sweden in the coming years. It continues with an identification of Swedish core values and national interests, and continues with an evaluation of Sweden's strategic situation. Finally, the thesis suggests a national security strategy for Sweden.

Future Trends and how they affect the North European Region

Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.

— Niels Bohr ¹²

Trends as a Tool to Anticipate Future Developments

Writing a national security strategy requires knowledge, or at least an opinion, about what the future brings and of history relevant to the situation. Since the level of exact knowledge drops exponentially with the stretch of the time span, studying basic trends is a method to limit the number of un-knowns and thus the amount of assumptions that it otherwise requires. In addition, strategy development does not necessitate a high level of detail in the forecast. It is much more important to capture accurately the foundational forces the strategy will confront. The strategy provides long-term objectives and a framework for action, wherein political flexibility and room for maneuver must exist. Detailed scenarios and events are useful to test the robustness and inherent flexibility of the strategy and, for specific planning purposes. Former Deputy Director of US National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, C. Thomas Fingar describe trends, as “...a small number of variables that we judge probably will have a disproportionate influence on future events and possibilities.”¹³ Strategic trends are foundational forces, invoking patterns of change within delineated sectors, and leading to overarching effects and ruptures. Because of the dynamics between different trends, the trends change systemic behavior both within and outside its sector.

The aim of this essay is to suggest a national security strategy for Sweden. There is thus no ambition to provide new research into the future trends area. It will rely heavily on well-researched and documented facts provided largely by a British¹⁴ and an American¹⁵ group. Being a small state, Sweden mainly focuses its interest on the North European region and to a lesser degree on the globe as a whole. For that reason, this paper does not include all trends identified in the two works above. Furthermore, while the information takes the research above as its point of departure, it restructures it to better suit the purpose of this paper. The thesis recognizes four foundational trends: climate change, globalization, energy transformation, and global population growth. However, the trends are merely symptomatic patterns of change and each trend has both drivers and consequences.¹⁶ Therefore, the description of each trend includes an analysis of the drivers of this particular trend. This is important because politics cannot change the trend itself, but it can affect the different drivers to a larger or lesser degree. The strategy must therefore consider the drivers rather than the trends, to prevent un-desirable consequences.




Figure 1. Drivers give rise to future trends, which in turn generates different consequences.

Logically, the uncertainty characterizing prediction about the future comes from at least three main sources. The first is that the drivers suddenly change or because two or more trends can reinforce or weaken each other in a dynamic relationship. The second is that different actors respond to the trends and thus alter the trends to a higher or lesser degree. Traditionally, the responses belong to the state's politic sphere of influence but since the end of the Second World War, other actors such as large corporations, media, and terrorist organizations etc. react to the trends and create an unpredictable dynamic. The third source are sudden shocks or ruptures that are likely known dangers but very difficult to plan for. Examples of the latter would be a severe meteor strike, a sudden outbreak of a very contagious disease like the black plague pandemic during the mid 14th century or an extremely large volcano outburst that could change the weather system globally.¹⁷

The paper describes the character of each trend first, it continues with an explanation of the drivers and finishes by summarizing potential consequences. The first trend to investigate is climate change.

Climate Change

There is compelling evidence that climate change is now unequivocal, with rising temperatures in the air and in the oceans, snow and ice smelting, and rising global sea levels.¹⁸ The temperature on earth by 2100 will most likely rise between two and five degrees Celsius and possibly even higher.¹⁹ Over the last years, it seems that the Western scientific community generally agrees to what the drivers of this trend are.

There is convincing scientific evidence to suggest that human activity in the transportation and energy areas contribute strongly to this trend, by substantially increasing the levels of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide or methane, in the atmosphere. This premise rests firmly on the laws of physics and chemistry. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) links a higher concentration of greenhouse gases to an increase in atmospheric and oceanic temperatures.²⁰ On the other hand, scientists have shown that other drivers were in operation over the course of Earth's history. Changes in the Earth's orbit and in solar activity accounted in previous eras for variations in the climate, as have probable meteorite strikes and volcano eruptions.²¹ Whatever drivers contribute most, emissions from human activities is the only driver that we can affect and it comes with the added benefit of that it may compensate for future orbital or solar driven disruptions. These drivers apparently work in concert and create an overarching pattern of climate change. With the drivers examined, the research turns to the resulting consequences, which obviously constitute a vital part of the description of each trend.

The consequences for the planet Earth are overwhelmingly negative. Reports claim that global warming likely intensifies water scarcity problems in Mediterranean-like climates in both hemispheres.²² This in turn leads to loss of arable land areas, lack of water to drink in certain areas, and may cause hygiene problems. However, increasing amounts of rainfall will occur on the extreme northern and southern parts of these hemispheres. Warmer oceans likely lead to more frequent and heavier storms. The most dangerous development according to one report is that an un-even distribution of increasing temperatures leads to disruptions of atmospheric and oceanographic circulation patterns and to the melting of the polar ice caps. Melting of the ice caps will generate rising sea levels with losses of land areas as a result.²³ It is not farfetched to imagine that losses of arable and populated land areas due to rising temperatures will cause large

parts of affected state's population to migrate north or south. North is perhaps more probable because of economic reasons.

As illustrated above, the effects of climate change will not disperse equally around the globe. Some regions will experience more negative effects than others will. Russia and Canada are examples of countries where vast areas potentially can become more inhabitable as their agricultural land areas open up due to warmer temperatures.²⁴ This will have the added benefit of creating easier access to potential natural resources. For northern tier countries, another advantage are that the Northern Passage will open up, sharply cutting sea transportation times and costs for a major part of the shipping between the North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean.²⁵ The un-equal distribution of effects around the planet is a symptomatic of the other trends as well. Every trend presents certain regions predominately with opportunities while other regions will experience a much higher degree of difficult threats. This holds true for the next foundational trend, globalization, as well.

Globalization

Globalization is a foundational trend that involves constantly increasing interconnectivity between people from all over the world. The trend has a social and an economic dimension. The social dimension entails the exchange of ideas and culture between different regions.²⁶ The extent to which ideas or culture, for instance Italian food, is found not just in the neighboring countries or in countries with an extensive Italian Diaspora, but in countries like Sweden which only has a small part of the population emanating from Italy, determines how globalized the ideas or culture are. Furthermore, globalization brings with it the concept of a world market for goods, labor, and services along with integrated financial systems.²⁷ Globalization integrates

supply and demand from different regions of the world. While it is easy to describe what Globalization is, it is more difficult to identify the drivers.

The great enabler for this trend is arguably technology and specifically communications technology. This includes development in means of transportation and the great strides in information technology development. It is far easier to travel to most regions of the world than it used to be and much of the communication in integrated financial systems today occurs automatically over great distances without people travelling. To an extent, technological invention is not only an enabler but also a driver. Technological progress seems driven by its own logic and humanity appears willing to find new ways to utilize the possibilities new technologies bring about. Furthermore, liberal market economies have always been on the lookout for new markets and suppliers of resources.²⁸ Recent technological inventions and applications have only reinforced this behavior and accelerated its potential.²⁹ Communications technologies have also enabled individuals by providing readily available global information. Culture and ideas tend to spread because people are inquisitive and the information is easy to access. For example, Iranian protesters in 2009-2010 made extensive use of Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube, to organize protests and to spread information of what went on in Teheran.³⁰ With globalized information technology, individuals suddenly have abilities unheard of before. While the drivers are not inherently good or bad, their consequences can be depending on situation and point of view.

The consequences of globalization are multiple. Since the 1950's, the world has experienced an enormous transfer of wealth from West to East, when governments in the Middle East nationalized oil companies and ensured a larger share of the revenue at the same time as chunks of Western manufacturing industry moved to countries in Asia, notably, Japan, Taiwan, and then

also to South Korea. This trend intensified and in the 2000's the economic and financial shifts from West to East became unprecedented in modern history.³¹ This shift has lifted approximately 135 million people out of poverty between 1999 and 2004. The World Bank expects the number of people living in the middle class to rise from 440 million to 1.2 billion in the coming decades.³² However, on the down side, many countries in the Third World, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, probably find it difficult to acquire sufficient resources to access and harvest the benefits from the globalization trend. This tendency will most likely increase economic and material inequality and perhaps even accelerate poverty in this part of the world.³³ With globalized communications, people living in parts of the world that do not benefit from current economic developments are much more aware of the inequality compared to before. In part, this may explain the rise of cross-national terrorism where perceptions of inequality likely play a part in the recruitment and popular support of these terrorist organizations.³⁴ Global communications brings global awareness, which in turn put the spotlight on inequalities that provide insurgents and terrorists with the necessary cause.³⁵ Furthermore, global communication technologies also help enable non-state organizations to organize and operate effectively. Since developments in communications technology enable non-state actors, it is only reasonable to assume that they will be further empowered as time goes by. To an extent, this resembles the situation a few centuries ago, before the nation states monopolized violence, and in effect became the only relevant type of actor in the international system.

The transfer of wealth from West to East also depends largely on the relocation of production means because of lower labor costs. As long as labor is cheaper in the East, Western states will depend on their technical innovation skills to continue to be relevant in the globalized economy. However, this demand and supply situation depends on access to relatively skilled and

low-cost labor and on comparatively low transportation costs. If these two premises change, it is perhaps valid to speculate that production may relocate to Africa, or even revert back to Western countries.

Finally, globalization has made possible an unprecedented interconnectedness with information technology, between states as well as within states. Most of the domestic and international finance markets depend highly on the functionality of information technology. This dependency gave rise to cyber attacks, or computer network attacks, that affect decision makers' cognitive processes, the informational content in subsystems, the information systems themselves or infrastructure and equipment controlled through information networks.³⁶

One enabler of globalization discussed earlier, low transportation costs depend to a high degree on free access to low-cost energy. How is this trend developing?

Energy Transformation

The third foundational trend is one that mainly affects the transportation sector in the Western world, while it affects the entire energy sector in many developing countries. The energy transformation mega-trend implies that societies need to substitute oil as a primary source of energy with other sources of energy. Interestingly, one study predicts that in 2025, the world is in the middle of this energy transformation phase.³⁷

The driver of this trend is quite evidently that modern societies consume oil and natural gas at a far higher rate than the planet can reproduce it. The Western world has always consumed vast amounts of this type of energy and their consumption has reduced the residual levels to such low quantities that scientists predict that output will be a fraction of current levels in 2050.³⁸ While Western consumption has increased modestly over the last decades, except in the US, the

consumption rates of some developing countries have grown exponentially. Countries with rapidly developing economies, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), are experiencing great increases in their demand for oil and natural gas. Thus, roughly in the same period as oil production culminates, the worldwide demand for this commodity keeps growing.³⁹ However, the increasing awareness of the challenges from another foundational trend, climate change, and fossil fuels' contributions to it is increasingly becoming an additional, significant driver. With this background, it is easy to realize that the consequences of this trend are significant.

The world largely divides into two categories concerning the effects of energy transformation. The large consumers of fossil fuels must adapt and probably diversify their energy sources, while the fossil fuel producers, who tend not to be big consumers, again except the US, need to adjust their economies in time, away from dependence on a singular source of national energy and income. Iran is one such example where a big oil exporter gradually changes from oil to natural gas as main source of energy.⁴⁰ In addition, oil importers must find new sources for their liquid fuel dependency in a timely fashion, otherwise they may put their and potentially large parts of the globalized economy at risk.⁴¹ Some argue that a too rapid transition to new energy sources also jeopardizes economic stability in oil dependent states, hence the importance of a controlled transition.⁴² However, given that the long lead-time to develop new technologies roughly coincides with the 2025-2035 period when many scientists predict that demand will outweigh supply, the time is arguably already here to begin seriously to develop new energy technologies. Studies indicate that it takes an average of 25 years for a new production technology to mature and spread widely in the energy sector.⁴³ On the other hand, global warming may ironically contribute to new, substantial oil findings in the Arctic areas and thus postpone the liquid fuels crises for oil dependent states.

Oil and natural gas exporting states have experienced a substantial windfall due to export incomes in the last twenty to thirty years.⁴⁴ That raises the expectation of the population for shares in the national oil and gas revenue and may lead to destabilization movements once this revenue decrease, if these states do not transform their own economies.⁴⁵ A profound transformation of the national economy is a process that takes a long time because it most likely will require changes in the educational system, a new legal foundation for the domestic financial market, a change of behavior on the actors involved, and funds to support the changes. In accordance with the timetable above, current oil exporters may only have about 15 years to complete this transition since most of them, except Russia and Canada, will not benefit from global warming and the potential for new oil and gas findings in previously unexploited areas of the globe. Moreover, many of the current energy exporters face negative impacts due to the climate change trend, because of their geographic location. Many of the energy exporters lie in areas with current or predicted water scarcity for example.⁴⁶ This has the potential to further damage the economic cohesion and structure of these states.

Inadequate supply of oil and natural gas can bring about changes in the global power distribution. Oil and natural gas exporters may experience possibilities to increase their influence on world events to a considerable extent in the relatively short time frame before oil and gas runs out totally or before the current oil and gas importers have switched to other sources of energy. This may tempt some states to coerce other states to comply with demands that they would not otherwise agree or commit to.⁴⁷ Another unfortunate consequence of the changing supply and demand balance is that some states may contemplate using the military instrument of power to ensure uninterrupted flows of energy.⁴⁸ With the consequences of energy transformation

established, what does research have to say about the fourth foundational trend, population growth?

Global Demographic Changes

This trend consists of the three different elements of population change: growth in sub-Saharan countries, aging population in the West and Japan, and urbanization. Sources state that global population trends are changing from high mortality and fertility rates to low mortality and fertility rates.⁴⁹ To put the matter into perspective, between 1750 and 1950 the world population grew from one to three billion people. From 1950 to 2000, it expanded from three to more than six billion people.⁵⁰ However, because of declining fertility rates, the global population may begin to decline after 2100, if current trajectories remain intact.⁵¹ The projected population growth up to 2100 mainly happens in India, China, and Africa and the African continent may hold up to 2.3 billion people in 2050.⁵² Still, the population trend includes more than population growth.

While Third World countries experience large youth bulges as described above, the industrialized countries experience the opposite. The populations in developed countries age at the same time as comparatively low fertility rates cause the work force to contract.⁵³ While the US is in the same basic situation, mounting immigration, predominately from Mexico, may prevent the population from shrinking. The situation is similar in Western Europe where immigrants from Africa or parts of Asia potentially replenish rapidly aging human resources. Research also reveals that the question is more of a concern for Italy, East European countries, Japan, Russia, and Ukraine where immigration is low and emigration already occurs.⁵⁴ In addition, there is the third element of this population trend to consider.

An important global demographic change is urbanization. Urbanization is of course not a new trend because it has been going on for several centuries. Predictions state that by 2035, 60% of the world population lives in urban areas, which is an unprecedented level in the history of the planet. The urban expansion takes place at a rate that in some areas outpaces the capacity to integrate the settlers properly.⁵⁵ With these three elements of global demographic change established, the paper turns to the factors that drive the trend.

An increase in the number of women in the childbearing age continues to expand at the same time as life expectancy and fertility rates drive the global population growth.⁵⁶ In the developed world, the population ages because life expectancy increases while fertility rates decline and this explains the regression of the population these parts of the world. There are different explanations for the difference in fertility rates between the undeveloped and the industrialized world. In less developed countries, children are economic assets from early on in age and later they are the enabler for their parents' retirement. As the complexity of the society increase, so does the needed level of education. Education is in most societies associated with expenses, which place a financial burden upon the family for a couple of decades. In addition, with increasing specialization, the children are less likely to contribute to the parent's economy or their retirement because they do not typically stay to work for their parents. Finally, long educations tend to impel women into having children later in their life compared to women in less developed societies.⁵⁷

Rapid and sometimes uncontrolled urbanization is another result of demographic change. Research projects that the bulk of the population increase on our planet will occur in cities of the developing world. Urbanization in the developed world has largely come to a halt. Wars, failed markets or ecological breakdowns cause this kind of urbanization, because it compels people to

move to urban areas in search of opportunities.⁵⁸ With the drivers established, attention turns to consequences.

The consequences of changing global demographic patterns are multiple. An increase in the total number of people on Earth leads to increased demands on resources. Unfortunately, most of the population increase takes place in areas that already lack some resources, such as water, food, and/or infrastructure. These areas will also experience population structures with a large proportion of young adults. Such a population imbalance has historically contributed to political violence and civil conflict.⁵⁹ A competition for scarce resources may also lead to conflict between and within countries.⁶⁰ On the other hand, a humanitarian crisis may develop even without conflict, depending on how fast the gap between resource demand and resource access arises. As before, migration will flow from south to north. In the north, the problems are sometimes almost the opposite.

An aging population and reductions in the work force jeopardize the economic foundations of many states, especially in Western Europe and Japan. Many of these states have built extensive welfare systems that require a large work force to be sustainable. The US is in the same situation albeit for different reasons. The US is currently the highest indebted state in the world⁶¹ and relies on the expectation of its ability to produce continued economic growth for credibility. Moreover, much of the US' perceived global power rests either directly or indirectly (military expenditure) on its economic performance and it is currently deemed somewhat vulnerable to different economic and financial ruptures because of its position as the world's most indebted nation.⁶² An extensive immigration of laborers, most likely predominately from Mexico in the case of the US and from Africa in the case of Europe, may alleviate or fully remedy the situation but that depends largely on how well these societies can integrate or

assimilate the immigrants.⁶³ However, another, or perhaps complimentary option, is for these states to encourage a higher fertility rate through economic and political incentives. The downside is that the results take up to a generation to materialize and thwart the current decline.⁶⁴ Furthermore, shrinking populations in these countries can have global repercussions. The well-being of the global, interdependent markets, on which most developing states depend, can be in jeopardy since they are part of the Western order, established by Europe and the USA.⁶⁵ It is difficult to predict the global consequences of failing economies in these states and in Japan, because it depends in part, on how ready emerging powers, i.e. BRIC-countries, are to shoulder the mantle of economic growth. Globalization thus links the destiny of developing states to that of the industrialized states for the foreseeable future. This brings the analysis back to the Third World states and the last element of the global demographic change - urbanization.

Rapid urbanization is likely to occur in areas where competition for resources is fierce. Perhaps one of the greatest dangers is that ungoverned spaces develop, where endemic criminal activity can flourish and spread.⁶⁶ Ungoverned spaces have proved to provide sanctuaries for organized crime, insurgency groups, and terrorist cells to recruit, organize, train, and equip, free from outside intervention. This has severely hampered humanitarian assistance in a number of cases before, to areas where the population unquestionably requires aid. The case of Sudan and its Darfur region comes to mind.⁶⁷ Thus, climate change, globalization, energy transformation, and global demographic change constitute foundational trends, each on their own right, but they also reveal a larger pattern when considered together.

Trends in Conclusion

Climate change, globalization, energy transformation, and global demographic change occur in parallel and the dynamics that they create between them hardly lends itself to precise predictions. What is more, different political decisions, some in response to the challenges the trends present, give rise to an action, reaction, and counteraction patterns between different actors and this affects the drivers of the trends as well as their consequences. However, one important conclusion is that the trends generate a set of multiple-stress zones where negative outcomes of the different trends converge and they are to a limited extent in northern South America, in Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, in northern South Asia and in parts of China.⁶⁸ These are the regions where the negative impact of the different trends converge and bring multiple pressures that are difficult to cope with, even for stable governments. It is reasonable to expect these regions to require a high degree of humanitarian assistance, in addition to government support. Consequently, it is logical to expect that the probability for conflict remain high in these regions.

This analysis rests on only a few variables but research reveals that they have the potential for a disproportionate effect on the future. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) predicts that the next 15-20 years hold more change than continuity, in their *Global Trends 2025* report.⁶⁹ They go on to state that geopolitical alterations and changes in the international order increase the expectation of surprise, discontinuities, and shocks.⁷⁰ Moreover, they concluded that the next two decades are a great historical turning point where many factors converge. The report also cautions that historically, rapid change can lead to dangerous developments.⁷¹ From a historical analysis, they provide insights that are useful to keep in mind: leaders and their ideas have great

impact on how the future develops, economic volatility is a major risk factor to stability, and global rivalries trigger discontinuities more than does technological change.⁷²

It is all too easy to focus on the risk that overwhelming change brings about and to forget that historically, change did not mean end of the world but it also brought major improvements. Certainly, changes brought negative consequences to some actors, while others prospered. Empires have come and gone, one type of influential actor substituted another, which sometimes brought personal disaster but in the grand scheme of things, humanity as a whole has prospered. This is so if prosperity equals high life expectancy, declining child deaths, higher material standards in average, a higher degree of personal freedom and more individual opportunities. These are good conditions emanating from continuous and gradual change and any national security strategy needs to address the opportunities and reinforce the drivers linked to this. However, there are people who have benefitted very little from this progress and their awareness of the existing inequalities is a global challenge that needs addressing, for global stability depends on it. This may be the most important lesson to learn from the past and something that policy makers must consider when they define national interest.

Swedish National Interests and Strategic Position

...a democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy.

— Joseph Nye⁷³

Definition of National Interest and National Core Values

Defining national interests is a central element in any national security strategy. The national interests define the ends that the state seeks. The ends are a description or vision of conditions that this particular state wants to see in the world.⁷⁴ The national interests usually include a balance of idealistic and realistic elements. If it is too idealistic, it is impossible to devise a strategy to obtain the goals and if it is too realistic, it restricts the strategy from realizing its long-term potential. The strategy itself is an action plan that realistically harnesses the national resources and applies the plan in ways that are consistent with the achievement of the national interests. The idealistic element stems from national core values that preferably reflect the mentality of the majority of the state's population.




Figure 2. The National Interest lens determines whether consequences are positive or negative.

Swedish Core Values and National Interests

An important, overarching assumption concerning Swedish core values and national interests is that the individual security depends on the security of the society as a whole, and on the stability of the international system. These are all interlinked.

Swedish core values span democracy, the rule of law, freedom, and human rights. These are equal to both the internal and external perspectives. Sweden furthermore believes in the value of peaceful international relations and trade.⁷⁵

An important philosophical belief on the part of the Swedish people is that international relations have the character of a multi-sum game rather than being a zero-sum game. By embracing this basic liberal tenet, Sweden recognizes that all players are winners in the end if they cooperate rather than compete. Not all may be winners on every single occasion, because cooperation requires compromise, but eventually, all continuous cooperation furthers all parties'

interests. In this respect, Sweden transfers the domestic game rules to the international arena and views life on the planet as being part of “Spaceship Earth”.⁷⁶

The national core values translate into national interests. The state believes that if it is successful in its pursuit of its national interests, it has created conditions beneficial for its core values. Sweden wants to preserve and develop its prosperity, safety, and security. This implies ensuring the safety of the population and their good health, an efficient and intact infrastructure, and the ability to maintain the core values. Externally, Sweden emphasizes an international system built on international law to further peace, freedom, and reconciliation in addition to regional stability and predictability. Furthermore, Sweden needs to secure its provision for the population, trade, bi- and multilateral relations as well as international institutions.⁷⁷

Swedish core values and basic national interests do not differ particularly much from other democratic states’ values and interests. The big difference is the underpinning assumption saying that all players can be winners if they cooperate and the fact that Sweden is a small state. This affects how the national security strategy develops. A small state depends on being influential in international institutions, therefore the well-being and efficiency of institutions such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) are important to Sweden, as they are vehicles to further Swedish national interests. However, as stated before, the achievement of the national interests and objectives must harmonize with the nation’s relative capabilities.

A Strategic Appraisal of Sweden’s Position in the Region

There are different schools of thought concerning a state’s position in the international system. Perhaps, the three most influential measures of the position of each state are its geopolitical situation, its resources, and its ability to influence. When devising a national security

strategy, it is useful to remember political scientist Professor Hans Morgenthau's estimation, saying that the elements of power divide into those that are relatively stable and those that are subject to constant change.⁷⁸ A state's geostrategic situation is an example of a fairly, rather than absolutely, stable element.

Geopolitics is the human factor within geography according to political scientist Jakup Grygel, while geostrategy is the geographic direction of a state's foreign policy.⁷⁹ In essence, these concepts describe that geography constitutes an important consideration, affecting strategic decision-making. This does not mean that geography is solely a deterministic factor. Two states with rather similar geographic circumstances do not necessarily pursue analogous domestic or foreign policies. From this, it is logical to conceive a third concept, the geostrategic situation of a country.

The geostrategic situation describes not only where a country is located geographically but also what its situation is in relation to other states in the vicinity. The strength by which states can influence each other is as much an effect of geographical distance as of cultural and political distance, according to political scientist Patrick O'Sullivan.⁸⁰ The reverse of this is that the surrounding states in a region have the greatest ability to influence another state in the region and the surrounding states are probably the focus of the geostrategic considerations for this state. Since the geostrategic situation is a function of both geography and geostrategy, both aspects need consideration.

Sweden's location north of the European continent, east of the Atlantic coastal societies, south of the Arctic, and west of the Eurasian landmass shapes its geostrategic situation. The Baltic Sea and the Western Ocean detaches it from the continent, which largely approximates its circumstances to that of an island. Sweden has a long coastline and a long land border with

Norway. The only other land border Sweden has is with Finland. Together with Denmark, Sweden dominates the choking point of all sea bound communication in and out of the Baltic Sea. Germany, France, and Great Britain largely dominate the North European region in terms of politics, together with the former Super Power Russia. The European continent was the scene of much conflict and tension in the last few centuries but the end of WWII and the Cold War stifled much of that competition. The Cold War brought tension between the East and West, with the fault line running through Central Europe, from north to south. The two sides confronted each other directly on the continent, while Sweden and Finland supplied a buffer zone in the northern hemisphere.⁸¹ Buffer zones were important for the former Soviet Union for historical reasons and this perspective largely explains the Soviet quest for East European territory after the end of WWII.⁸² It is logical to see the Swedish choice of continued neutrality during the Cold War in this context.⁸³ Even though the era of Super Power confrontation is relegated to the history books, tension between Russia and the West remains and the conflict between the entities has moved east, and all the way north to include the Baltic States. With the Baltic States members of NATO, the Swedish buffer zone became largely irrelevant. The Cold War united Western Europe and reduced traditional tensions between the continental powers and Great Britain and the European Union is arguably the new scene for peaceful competition between the traditional, regional powers. With Sweden's geostrategic position in mind, what does an estimation of Swedish national resources reveal?

According to Morgenthau, natural resources, industrial capacity and population constitute important elements of national power.⁸⁴ Natural resources include food and raw materials.⁸⁵ Sweden is self-sufficient vis-à-vis food and it exports its surplus, mainly to other EU-members. However, it chooses to import some food-related raw materials, either because they are difficult

to grow in Sweden or because it is economically more efficient to acquire them from external suppliers.⁸⁶ Timber, hydropower, and iron ore make up the basis of the country's raw materials while the Swedish industry is geared towards iron and steel, precision equipment, wood pulp and paper products, processed foods, and motor vehicles.⁸⁷ Sweden has a larger industrial base and service sector than it can maintain on its own. Having a trade surplus is thereby a necessity, if the country intends to maintain its current welfare levels. The Swedish trade surplus is averaging 7% since the mid 1990's.⁸⁸

Sweden has managed to balance its energy consumption against its domestic energy production in all areas except liquid fuels. Hydropower and nuclear power bear the brunt of the energy production with wind generated power picking up recently.⁸⁹ To alleviate the consequences of being dependent on oil imports for liquid fuel, Sweden diversified the suppliers after the 1970's fuel crisis and today they include Russia, Denmark, Norway, Venezuela, Great Britain, and Iran. Sweden also developed its refining industry to the point where it is a net exporter of refined oil. Finally, Sweden managed to reduce its dependency on oil from 73% in 1973 to 31% in 2006.⁹⁰ This concludes the examination of Swedish resources and leads to the last aspect of national power – the population.

The Swedish population is 9.3 million people in 2010.⁹¹ Of this number, 4.9 million constitute a skilled labor force.⁹² This is a comparatively small number in relation to most other states in the North European region, except for Denmark, Norway, and Finland. All of the parameters above belong to the traditional view of national power but in more recent years scholars have introduced an additional concept of national power, soft power.

Political scientist, Joseph S. Nye is arguably the inventor and a strong proponent for the concept of soft power. He makes the case that soft power rests on a state's ability to set the

political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others. It co-opts rather than coerces. If other countries view this power as legitimate, they probably have less inclination to challenge it.⁹³ Because of its traditional status as neutral or non-aligned, Sweden enjoyed a high level of confidence in multinational bodies, such as the UN, during the Cold War. Membership in multinational institutions was beneficial for Sweden because the membership gave access to global audiences and Swedish leaders could exploit numerical advantages by gaining support from many other small states.⁹⁴ Additionally, Sweden embarked on a program of economic development aid to third world countries and traditional peacekeeping, which lend it further credibility in the eyes of developing states.⁹⁵ By adopting these policies, Sweden gained a political clout that was clearly greater than its economic or military weight would suggest. In today's international politics, the benefit of being neutral has markedly dwindled since the whole concept of neutrality requires at least two comparatively powerful opponents and this is not the situation at present. After all, the whole idea behind neutrality is to avoid war by convincing the opposing sides that neutrality will not have negative consequences for either of the opposing sides.⁹⁶ With the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the opposing sides in the post-war militarized ideological contest disappeared. With no potential for major military conflict in the region, neutrality loses its meaning. After all, whom would Sweden be neutral against? It is reasonable to contend that in this setting, Sweden's soft power relies more on its societal values, including respect for other cultures and state sovereignty, equality, emphasis on the civic society, respect for human rights and law and justice. In practice, the Swedish society may be attractive because of the combination of an extensive welfare program and a liberal market economy, liberal democracy, a high degree of equality between sexes and its cooperation-oriented foreign policy.

In conclusion, each state has inherent strengths and weaknesses because of their geostrategic location. Sweden's weakness by virtue of its geostrategic position is that it lies next to a traditional fault line between East and West. It is a comparatively small state, surrounded by much more powerful countries to the south, west and east. However, this weakness has diminished with the termination of the Cold War and because most European states are members in the European Union. The comparatively high degree of agreement between the members in the EU provides Sweden with economic and political opportunities that counteract the weakness of the geostrategic position. What is more, the EU has defused most of the tension between traditional European powers and provided the region with a rather benign security environment. The EU augments Swedish soft power opportunities since it adds yet another institutional vehicle for the country to influence world events because of its membership. The only question mark exists with respect to Russia's future development, where support for democracy has dropped significantly in recent years and foreign policy statements have become more aggressive.⁹⁷ Some of Russia's actions in the 1990's and the 2000's were worrisome. The Russian heavy-handedness in Chechnya,⁹⁸ their meddling in Ukrainian politics,⁹⁹ the computer network attacks against Estonia emanating from Russian servers,¹⁰⁰ the military attack on Georgia, and their willingness to use energy supplies as a coercive tool against Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania,¹⁰¹ illustrates how Russia is willing to create tension in an otherwise stable region. With the governing factors established, the content turns from analysis to strategy construction.

A proposal for a Swedish security strategy

Some people live in the present, oblivious of the past and blind to the future. Some dwell in the past. A very few have the knack of applying the past to the present in ways that show them the future.

— Richard Nixon¹⁰²

The Purpose of Strategy

Leadership is the liberation of talent.

— Peters and Austin¹⁰³

Every large organization, containing many people, needs a vision for the future and a basic plan on how to get as close to the vision as possible. This is as true in the corporate world as in statecraft. The vision sets a common understanding of what the entity strives for and explains the purpose of the endeavor. Moreover, a good strategy incorporates a speed vector that gives companies or states a sense of direction of not only where it is going but also how soon it will get there. Consequently, the strategy must incorporate a plan for how the company or state intends to employ its resources. The plan does not have to be very detailed but should describe in broad terms in what ways the entity intends to employ its means to get as close as possible to its vision for the future. An important aspect of strategy is that it needs to be robust in the sense that the strategy must enable the organization or state to adapt in a timely, efficient and effective manner in the face of a constantly changing environment.¹⁰⁴ The strategy is important because it forms the basis for decentralized execution. With a sound strategy, different ministries, departments,

agencies, divisions etc. knows how to manage and develop their own areas of responsibility. Delegation is of course of outmost importance in any large bureaucracy since it dramatically reduces the level of internal communication, promotes effectiveness, and preserves flexibility.¹⁰⁵ It liberates the creativity of coworkers and allows them to plan and conduct their activity with a high degree of independence and to meet challenges they way they see fit, without digressing from the vision.

From the research done for this paper, it seem that for some reason, most existing national security strategies mainly seem to regard the threats to the strategy and to the well-being of the nation. They largely neglect possible opportunities that future developments may hold. However, it is arguably as important to position the state in a way that enables it to reap the benefits of the opportunities that the future brings, as it is to hedge against future challenges and threats. Consequently, a good security strategy cannot only apply to worst-case situations. The strategy should attach attention to both the drivers of change and to the possible outcomes. All actions planned with regard to the drivers are proactive while measures planned to meet consequences are generally reactive. As proactive generally is better than reactive, the accuracy of the predictions bears a heavy burden with reference to the success of the strategy. Nevertheless, assumptions make up the basis for predictions, which mean that the strategy must be robust enough to be successful despite that some assumption may prove untrue. For that reason, strategy making involves a certain degree of hedging and safeguarding. The art in strategy making is to balance the requirements for redundancy with those of effectiveness. Too much hedging may tap the national resources too heavily and deny national economic development or the allocation of resources on welfare. After all, the objective of the security strategy is to ensure that economic

development and the prosperity of the population progress, and the strategy should not limit these activities more than necessary by expending too many resources.




Figure 3. The national security strategy should seek to reinforce drivers that lead to desired consequences while it should try to change those drivers that lead to negative consequences, according to the national interest. Furthermore, the strategy should embrace positive trend consequences while mitigating consequences with negative effects.

The strategy should contain actions that either reinforce or change the trend drivers, depending on if their consequences are positive or negative, when viewed through the national interest lens. It should also incorporate or mitigate the consequences themselves depending on whether the national interest lens presents them as threats or opportunities.

The following section is action oriented which means that the structure revolves around recommended measures intended to cope with the drivers and consequences of the four different

trends. However, as the research evolved, it became more natural to categorize the actions in terms of geographic span, i.e. global, regional, and local. Nevertheless, one area forms the foundation upon which the strategy rests and that is information. This is thus the first part of the strategy to consider.

Requirements for Information - More Change than Continuity

During times when analysts expect more change than continuity, information requirements soar. Change is normally complex and unpredictable because of the dynamic interrelationship between many factors. Sociology Professor John Urry for example, argues that much of the operating content within the globalization trend are networks. He claims that there are often massive disproportionalities between causes and effects, at both the agency and structural level. This causes a high degree of unpredictability.¹⁰⁶ These factors have two consequences for the strategy. The first is positive because as discussed before, a strategy informed by events at the systemic level contains fewer assumptions than a strategy founded on the agency level, i.e. scenarios. On the other hand, even if the assumptions are fewer, they are still assumptions and the strategist needs to keep track of them and update the strategy itself when events prove one or more of the assumptions to be wrong. In order to mitigate this uncertainty, the state must ensure access to adequate levels of international and domestic information.

In this regard, Sweden is no different from any other state and the strategy recommendations are more or less universal. The two main ways to acquire information is logically through strategic intelligence and embassies. Sweden should thus properly resource a strategic intelligence body that operates across all instruments of power and not only the military. In addition, and perhaps more important, Sweden should proliferate its embassies and ensure that

each embassy holds an adequate staffing. In-depth estimations of other states' capabilities and intentions require personal contacts. The embassies of course, provide as much information about Sweden and Swedish intentions as they gather from host states. The emphasis on the important role of the embassies is to ensure the preeminence of diplomacy in international relations. The other instruments of power only have a supporting role to play, except perhaps for the economic element where diplomacy is one of the main instruments to support economic development.

Sweden should also formalize cooperation between the government and its governmental departments and its research agencies and universities. This enables a broader analysis and fosters a wider discussion of global and regional developments. Because it taps and funnels a wide set of assets to policymakers, it constitutes an efficient use of national resources.

In sum, if predictions imply that the near future holds rapid changes over continuity, a decrease in strategic intelligence analysis and overseas embassy representation epitomize a national weakness. Overseas embassy presence comes with the added benefit of increasing opportunities for international cooperation between states, non-governmental organizations (NGO's), and the corporate world. Access to accurate information is a pre-requisite for strategy. How does it affect strategy at the global level?

Extending Global Goods - Development Support

A global good is "something everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to others."¹⁰⁷ Example of global goods are international stability, free and just trade, a well-functioning environment, free access to the oceans and space, to name a few. More controversial are public goods like democracy and human rights. They fit well into the definition of global

goods but it is important to recognize that they are culturally toned values. From a Swedish perspective, based on its core values, all of the above are desirable global goods that lead to peace and stability. Since Sweden as stated before, regards the international system as a multi-sum game, it is in line with Swedish interests to promote development globally, if global development in turn generates peace and stability. This section illustrates the connection between Swedish security and the extension of global goods, and suggests appropriate actions to further this goal.

The first trend to address is climate change. This trend affects the global environment and as illustrated before, it brings mostly negative effects except for some regions. The extensive use of carbon-based energy needs addressing in order to tackle the driver of this trend. Sweden should be at the forefront of an initiative directed at finding alternate energy sources. This initiative should stimulate international cooperation, which is in accordance with Swedish small state requirements. The initiative comes with the added benefit of easing the need for liquid fuels transition as part of the energy transformation trend. The aim is to transform the energy sector and not just to limit the use of carbon-based energy. It is important to begin this process sooner rather than later because it leads up to a smoother transition. It reduces the amount of money spent annually, gives adequate time for trial and error to find one or more replacements for oil, and has the potential to lessen the un-stabilizing effects a rapid transition might bring.¹⁰⁸ Historically, energy transitions have produced new and more efficient technologies, such as the transition from wood to coal that brought the steam engine and coal to oil that resulted in the internal combustion engine. This transition thus holds the potential to spawn new opportunities.

In order to mitigate the negative effects of climate change, Sweden should direct some of its agricultural research towards de-desertification, inexpensive seawater desalination, efficient

irrigation, and to crops that can endure higher temperatures and dryer climates. Again, Sweden should try to spark extensive international cooperation in this area and perhaps channel research and development support through multi-national institutions. This may prevent the development of conflict ignited by resource scarcity, human suffering, the need for extensive disaster relief, and large populations from migrating north at a pace where integration is virtually impossible. Massive and sudden migration can put a great deal of strain on otherwise stable and peaceful areas such as Northern Europe.¹⁰⁹ Helping make resources more available in certain areas alleviates the problem of increasing population too.

Emerging population patterns may lead to a kind of super urbanization that lends itself to the creation of ungoverned spaces. This in turn puts pressure on Western societies to continue to perform peacekeeping missions, perhaps with a more legal than military profile, to tackle criminality. However, this development also most likely will lead to insurgencies, which in turn may require Western societies to support the existing authorities with counterinsurgency missions and Foreign Military Development support, in order to guarantee continued stability. In this setting, it is important to remember the importance of limited objectives. Security specialist, Jeffrey Record argues in effect that any intervention in the militarized but political struggle that an insurgency or guerilla war is, should be taken on in support of the existing governing bodies. He continues by saying that regime change is a much too big undertaking.¹¹⁰ One might also add that this is even without considering the moral ramifications of intervening into another sovereign society. Record discusses the US in particular but his view probably is just as applicable for Sweden. Heinie Aderholt, an experienced counterinsurgency officer in the USAF, offers that the US “Americanized” the Vietnam conflict to the detriment of South Vietnamese legitimacy and the “Americinzation” made the US involvement expand beyond the original

limits.¹¹¹ An interpretation of these opinions may suggest that it is less costly for all if intervention comes early on, mainly consisting of policing assistance rather than military forces, before the situation deteriorates, and security conditions require military intervention. This is probably even more relevant if massive and ungoverned urban areas develop.

From a military standpoint, it suggests that Sweden should mainly facilitate the use of its ground forces for these types of operations and only intervene with limited political objectives. It is probably better to pursue more ambitious political objectives through other instruments of power than the military. A further elaboration of this concept follows below. The best use of air power in these types of settings is indirectly, where air supports ground forces.¹¹² However, if the insurgency pushes through to conventional operations, direct application of air power could come into play.¹¹³ Political scientist, Robert Pape makes the case that in this situation and for limited objectives, air and ground forces working together form an efficient instrument.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, since terrorism and piracy constitute a threat to energy production and transportation, the Swedish Navy should be able to participate in operations aimed at preserving free access to the open seas as this supports two global goods at the same time – free flow of energy and open oceans.¹¹⁵ In summary, all the suggestions above represent an outside-in perspective. Perhaps even more important are the suggestions that work from inside-out.

As discussed before, globalization can be good or bad depending on how well integrated a society is into the globalization process. If one accepts that globalization is inherently good for those able to participate in it, it follows that those included have the obligation to extend the global goods provided by it to as many societies around the world as possible. This will also have the advantage of reducing the number of conflicts that global inequalities drive. As seen before in the trends chapter, the transfer of wealth that takes place under the umbrella of

globalization lifts thousands of people out of poverty every year. It would then seem that the goal of an ultimate peacemaker is to spread the positive effects of globalization and make it truly global. The objective for development support is thus to allow for more just trade and to prepare the states outside globalization for participation in it. Researchers deem Africa as particularly sensitive to protectionism, with trade barriers that are difficult for the countries on the African continent to circumvent.¹¹⁶ Since globalization incorporates a high degree of foreign direct investment, measures need to help organize the countries for these direct investments. Logically, the elements required to attract foreign investment are the rule of law, functioning political, social, and economic institutions, and a skilled work force. The underpinning assumption is that countries in need of development help are poor per definition and they are thus attractive to external companies because of comparatively low pay grades. Note that democracy is not included in the prerequisites for participation in the globalization game, as illustrated by China and Russia.¹¹⁷ However, as discussed before, spreading democracy lies inherent in Swedish national interests.

As usual for Sweden, development support is probably most efficient if coordinated through international bodies. If the UN is too large, the EU might be limited and efficient enough to coordinate a substantial amount of foreign aid. The underlying assumption is that a functioning state is a precondition for a stable society, able to participate in globalization. Consequently, Sweden should direct its foreign aid towards strengthening and developing existing institutions rather than trying to create new ones. Stable, legitimate, and capable institutions are probably a necessary ingredient for a society whose core social/moral principles rests on the rule of law. Furthermore, they also facilitate conditions indispensable for a well-functioning education system. The last two pieces are support to infrastructure and health care.

There is a choice of angle of attack between a bottom-up and a top-down perspective with regard to how societies develop. Choosing the bottom-up perspective supports the strengthening of the civic society. Adrian Hastings maintains that a nation always thinks of itself as a deep horizontal comradeship. He goes on to claim that even when the state created the nation, it is not a nation as such before it recognizes that the state exists to support the nation rather than the opposite way.¹¹⁸ This is a bottom-up perspective and it relates closely to that emphasizing the importance of a well-developed civic society for democratic development.¹¹⁹ Therefore, aid supporting the development of the civic society may be an appropriate support to democratic development from within the society itself. This represents an inside-out approach in contrast to where intervening states builds democracy by creating institutions and procedures, which is an outside-in approach.

Finally, supporting the equality of women seems to be an efficient vehicle for societal change. The US study *Global Trends 2025* identifies three areas where female participation furthers development. First, the increase in global productivity is largely dependent on the inclusion of women into the economic activities in a country. Second, they claim that there is a robust data correlation between women's level of education and a country's Gross Domestic product (GDP). The data indicates that the higher the level of education, the greater the GDP. Finally, a high degree of female participation in a country's politics appears to change governmental priorities to societal issues such as healthcare, the environment, and economic development, although this correlation is less conclusive.¹²⁰ When the focus shifts from the global arena to the regional, some suggestions change while others remain.

Regional Stability

As discussed before, a comparatively small country such as Sweden benefits from active participation in multinational institutions, because its possibilities to influence and shape the international environment increases, either through support from more powerful peers or through a collection of small states with similar goals. As seen earlier, a traditional Swedish strength, stemming from Sweden's neutrality, largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War. The main institutional vehicle in the Northern European region is the European Union. Consequently, Sweden should be a very active member in the Union. The other influential institution in Northern Europe is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. Since there is a Swedish debate on whether or not to apply for membership in NATO, it is relevant to spend some time on the subject. Even though a political body governs NATO, its area of activity is mainly the military element of national security. The EU has arguably much broader perspectives and even though the common European Security Strategy and its efforts to coordinate foreign policy leave much to desire, the collective foreign policy of NATO is even less coherent than the EU's. This is not so strange because NATO as a defensive alliance mostly coordinates its defense policy against emerging threats and to activities covering Foreign Internal Defense (FID) support. Furthermore, the US drives much of NATO's military operations post-Balkan. The US and Russia chose to militarize their relations at the end of the Second World War because of mutual distrust. That this resulted in a 40-year nuclear standoff that overshadowed most security politics during this period is common knowledge. More surprising is perhaps that the US chose to continue to have military overtones to its foreign policy after the end of the Cold War.¹²¹ The process follows a tradition, perhaps established in the Vietnam War and continued through Grenada, Libya, and Panama, where the US used military force to the detriment of diplomacy.

Less surprising and more understandable, given this background, is the US military response after terrorists attacked on 9/11 2001. This is the first attack on US soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have naturally affected NATO's members and their policy because the US is a very influential member of this organization. The protracted character of both these wars may have a cautioning effect on further US military adventurism. Perhaps the most evident signpost for this sobering development is the statement of the current US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates. He declares that "kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented..."¹²² This signifies a reversion to perhaps a more appropriate and historically traditional balance of the US national instruments of power. To clarify the message even further, he declares, "The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan – that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire – anytime soon."¹²³ It is logical to assume that NATO reflects this US evolvement and assumes a higher reluctance to use its military capability outside of continental Europe for major military operations as opposed to smaller contingency operations. If NATO reduces itself to mostly a provider of military capability to the EU and an upholder of the famous Article V in the NATO Treaty¹, then a Swedish membership

¹ NATO's Article V reads as follows: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed

seems unnecessary. However, this is only if assessments of future developments rule out major war in Europe. The previous trend analysis seems to support this conclusion. There is no major driver pushing a development towards European major war. However, there are drivers and signs as discussed before, that point to the possibility of limited military operations in the Northern European continent. Competition for energy and resources in the Arctic may hit the boiling point and with pipelines in the Baltic, Russia suddenly has legitimate security interests there too. This pipeline also enables Russia to bypass certain East European countries for energy delivery to Western Europe, which gives Russia a higher degree of freedom in dealing with Eastern Europe in general. If this prediction is accepted, it makes sense that Sweden has very little to gain from a formal membership in NATO. However, Sweden should strive to have close ties with the organization if the prediction does not hold true and because the EU is unlikely to duplicate the military capability residing within the NATO structure. In summary, the EU constitutes the major regional institution through which Sweden should channel its active participation.

The political relationships in the Northern European region are stable and without much tension. As discussed upstream, most of the current challenges are economic except for relations to Russia, criminality, and societal vulnerability to cyber attacks. The European relationship with Russia is one of tension between integrating Russia as much as possible without allowing it to

force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

dominate European politics. Russia experiences a high degree of domestic pressure because of the centrifugal forces created by political struggle between divergent groupings.¹²⁴ The balance of power within Russian politics matters very much and explains Russian foreign policy actions to some degree.¹²⁵ The Western states must recognize this, accept the fact that Russia also has legitimate national interests, and try to reconcile these with European interests. However, as discussed before, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to utilize coercive means in order to accomplish its goals. This can never be acceptable to any European state. Russia has proven to be strategically astute, integrating all instruments of power in coercive pursuit of its objectives, as discussed before. It has specifically used the economic, informational, and military instruments of power for just the limited objective, short endurance, campaigns advocated earlier for Sweden and the rest of the West. A possible danger for Europe lies in its dependence on Russian energy. Energy is important to all states and Russia has shown willingness to use energy supply, or rather the threat of cutting it off, to compel other states to concessions. Germany largely depends on Russian energy supply and it has demonstrated tendencies to appease Russia.¹²⁶ This may lead to rifts between different factions within the EU and cause political tension. Furthermore, new pipelines that run through the Baltic Sea rather than through East European countries disconnects these states from West Europe's energy supply and may give Russia more leeway in using coercive means against these Eastern states.¹²⁷ Sweden can contribute to Baltic stability by ensuring its own military presence in the area, from the Gulf of Finland all around Scandinavia to its Western Seas. This entails the blue forces, i.e. air and naval presence. This has the added benefit of providing the Baltic States with a stable and secure Baltic environment, something NATO is likely to appreciate as well. Continuous Swedish naval and air

presence in and over the seas comes with the added benefit of providing stability to the sea-lanes of communication that carry the weight of Swedish trade.

On the other hand, if the energy transition trend not only replaces oil but also natural gas, the situation will change radically. Russia will be deprived of its perhaps most important external income,¹²⁸ energy export, at the same time as it loses its ability to drive a wedge between European states. Either this can lead to a Russia that is more inwardly focused or to an activist Russia that has to rely more on its military instrument of power in order to continue to influence its near abroad. The time right before such an energy transition takes place is likely the most dangerous. European states must be prepared to engage Russia diplomatically to avert any risks of a militarization of the relationships between them. The risk for Russian adventurism may be high in Eastern Europe because Russia would lose much of its advantage over its near abroad in Europe.

Perhaps the greatest challenges that globalization brings to the region are economic difficulties and transnational criminality. Some of the East and South East European economies are less stable than desired.¹²⁹ International cooperation should aim at strengthening these economies and enable East European states to be better able to reap the benefits of globalization. This ongoing process occurs at different levels in parallel. Transnational crime takes advantage of weaknesses in the international system. These crime organizations are perhaps the ultimate capitalists that use violence and corruption to further their financial interests. They use dissimilarities between different states' legal systems and benefit from the fact that legal systems are highly associated with the state's sovereignty.¹³⁰ They also take advantage of the same information technological developments that enable and drive the globalization trend. While states have been quick to align themselves militarily to assist cooperation and security, they have

not done so in the legal sphere, at least not in modern times. The EU is the institutional vehicle through which Sweden should try to stimulate as tight judicial cooperation between states as possible. International cooperation is likely the only way to reduce the level of transnational criminality.

The climate and demographic trends contain interesting and perhaps mutually reinforcing dynamics. The result is likely the emergence of migration to the North European region. As seen before, people will migrate because of the youth bulges where people move to get work opportunities and because some areas may be more or less uninhabitable because of climate change.¹³¹ To counter this, Sweden should work within the EU to form a coherent European policy for energy transformation and to begin thinking about what a common European policy on the integration of economic and climate migrants should look like. There will likely be a difference between Northern and Southern Europe in this regards as it is fair to assume the possibility that Southern Europe may experience some of the negative climate effects themselves, being further to the south. This means that these societies are victims of double pressures.

Furthermore, climatic changes in the Barents Sea region risk exacerbating existing territorial conflicts when ice melting gives access to natural resources.¹³² This does not affect Sweden directly because Sweden has no coastline bordering these seas but new sea lines of communications will open up and facilitate Swedish trade. The potential for rising tension up north suggest that it is prudent for Sweden to maintain a military presence in its Northern territories, mainly ground and air forces for geographical reasons. Again, the objective is to gather intelligence and have a stabilizing effect. Thus, this is something Sweden should prepare

for. In addition to its global and regional activities, Sweden should also take domestic actions to be prepared for the future.

Local – Preparing Sweden

At the local level, the Swedish national security strategy should contain elements that support the global and regional level activities as well as actions concerned with the domestic situation specifically. One of the most important elements in a potential Swedish strategy, and a recurring theme throughout the paper, is the importance of multinational institutions to further Swedish interests. Consequently, Sweden should appropriately resource its international departments and agencies to enable them to participate fully in the institutional work. Sweden's national institutions must be able to cope with their domestic responsibilities as well as their international duties.

To affect drivers of the climate change trend and to mitigate its effects, Sweden should reduce its use of oil based liquids fuels as much as possible. Natural gas is, as discussed above, not much of an issue for Sweden. As illustrated elsewhere, Sweden's energy demand in other areas than liquid fuels are satisfied mainly through hydropower and nuclear energy. The security strategy should drive the government to stimulate public agency and private industry research and development to new sources for liquid fuel. The aim is to stimulate as diverse technologies as possible since science has yet to find the optimal solution to replace oil. Current research in new energy is unfocused and fragmented.¹³³ However, it is important to balance properly investments in new technologies so as not to waste any resources. Furthermore, as research illustrated above, because Sweden may benefit from climate change, in the short term, it should begin making plans on how to best capitalize on these advantages. One area to consider may be

gradual investments in infrastructure in Northern Sweden to make use of currently uninhabited land areas. Sweden may also be able to export more food than it currently does because of warmer climate that opens up new land for cultivation. The Northern infrastructure projects can be an integral part of the plan to incorporate climate and economic migrants from Africa and other parts of the world.

The demographic trend may lead to migration pressures on Sweden and its neighbors. Sweden should therefore work hard to develop functioning integration policies, acceptable to the Swedish population as well as to the immigrants. Sweden can benefit greatly from immigration if it can find ways to integrate the migrants properly into the economy because it helps reversing the trend of an aging population and a decreasing workforce. It may bring a rapid increase in population that can finance existing welfare benefits and contribute to a growing economy. Moreover, Sweden should actively encourage higher birth rates to prevent a declining population. Because the Swedish work force consists of both sexes, economic measures are required to achieve the goal. As seen before, lack of money and time is what prevent women from having many children in modern economies.¹³⁴ Government stimulus should thus include measure that targets both variables.

In order to reap the benefits of globalization, Sweden should continue to develop its educational system. It is not very likely that Sweden will become a competitive producer of commercial goods, other than those that incorporate advanced technologies and production procedures. Therefore, Sweden should have an educational system that promotes creativity and innovation. It should accordingly encourage corporate research and development. This is how Sweden can continue to have the positive trade balance that is necessary if Sweden wants to keep having a larger economy than the population can support. The other side of the coin is that

Sweden should develop cyber defenses in order to reduce its vulnerability to cyber attack. Again, the role of the government is to stimulate and perhaps regulate protective measures intended to reduce societal vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it should develop a capability for active defense against this type of threat that can come from both states and non-state actors. This requires the establishment of a cyber intelligence capability.

From a military standpoint, Sweden should emphasize light ground forces, able to participate in operations abroad in accordance with the suggestions in the global goods section above. If the strategist believes that history is linear, the assumption would be that relations in Europe would be more and more peaceful. However, if the strategist regards history and future developments as cyclical in character, the risk of major military conflict may return to Europe in the future. Swedish prudence suggests that it should keep a limited number of heavier ground forces to meet future national contingencies. Moreover, Sweden should keep Air Forces and Naval Forces able to have continuous presence in the southern Baltic Sea in order to promote stability in the region and for the Baltic States. Air Forces and ground forces are needed up north to maintain a presence in case Arctic rivalries spread.

Sweden should emphasize police forces capable of functioning in the ungoverned spaces that are likely to develop. The police forces are probably best suited to help bring law and order in the mega cities that expand uncontrollably. Furthermore, the police and the judicial system in general need adequate resourcing to participate in international cooperation to prevent transnational criminal organizations from operating successfully in the grey zones existing between different states' legal systems.

Finally, Sweden should try to establish a high degree of international cooperation concerning foreign development aid with the hope of making it more efficient and effective. This

is perhaps the most important aspect of supporting international peace and stability. Foreign development aid can also reduce the level of militarization of foreign policy and revert to more traditional efforts where the military instrument of power is subordinated to the diplomatic and all instruments of power are subordinated to national security strategy.

Conclusion

The future is not ordained by anybody but us.

— Sir Michael Howard¹³⁵

This paper has shown the need for strategy. All states need it but small states need it more. It is necessary to plan a coherent set of actions aimed at taking a state to as near the position where it wants to be in the future as possible. It contains actions that mitigates threats and capitalize on opportunities. The point of departure for the strategy are Swedish national core values in addition to a realistic appreciation of Sweden's strategic position. A sensible and far-sighted strategy can help a state to create its own future, within limits. While there are many methods available to develop strategy, this paper advocates one in particular.

Predicting the future is a difficult undertaking but likely world developments must nevertheless underpin and inform long-range strategy. Uncertainty infects all prediction but this paper argues that by utilizing the foundational trend method, it is possible to capture accurately overarching patterns of change. There is a clear risk that by using scenarios as point of departure for strategy development, these large patterns of change disappear in all the little details required to develop the scenarios. However, scenarios are important tools to test the robustness of the strategy. The major trends identified in the paper are climate change, globalization, energy transformation, and demographic alterations.

Sweden should shape its future according to its national interests and do so on three levels. The first is the global where the underlying assumption says that an equal spread of global goods supports peace and stability. The next level is the regional, that entails the North European area in the case of Sweden, and the final level is the national level. One important finding is that Sweden needs to participate actively in multinational institutions in order to be influential. On the global level, the UN is the best institution while the EU is the regional equivalent.

Specifically, Swedish strategy should limit the driver of climate change by working to reduce its and other nations' use of carbon-based energy. It should aim to foster cooperative development of, in particular, new types of liquid fuels, both nationally and internationally. Sweden should try to help mitigate the negative effects of climate change by supporting states in the risk zone with proactive measures. It should be ready to benefit from the potential short-term opportunities that climate change may bring to a country situated up north.

Sweden should strive to reinforce the drivers of globalization and use efficient development support to make countries that currently are outside the process ready to participate and reap benefits from the goods that globalization brings. Thus, it should expand the positive side of globalization while working to limit the negative sides of it. The negative sides include economic struggles for some countries and the spread of transnational criminal networks. Furthermore, Sweden should adjust domestically to be able to benefit as much as possible from the opportunities of globalization.

Concerning energy transition, Sweden should focus on liquid fuels and providing stability to the Northern European region. Sweden should work diplomatically through the EU to find as many common areas of interests as possible with Russia to foster cooperation rather than conflict. However, continental European dependency on Russian energy and the negative

consequences of energy transformation for Russia may contain the seeds for potential conflict in the future. Sweden should mitigate future tension by diplomatic means and through the provision of a continuous military presence in the Baltic Sea region in order to ensure stability. This comes with the added benefit of being beneficial to the Baltic States.

It is best to respond to patterns of demographic change at the global level through development support and through reducing the effect of the drivers for climate change and mitigating the effects where they take place. However, Sweden needs to stimulate higher birth rates in order to safeguard its welfare programs and the quality of life for its population. Sweden should also develop its integration policies to make them more efficient and legitimate in the eyes of the citizens and the immigrants.

Finally, the thesis illustrates the specific perspectives of small states. This perspective takes into account the relative low levels of hard power of a small state compared to a larger state. If the small state neighbors a large state, its perspective is uniquely that of a small state, where its possibilities to shape the future lies in its ability to develop and utilize soft power. The paper also aims to show how a state can devise a national security strategy that responds to the drivers and consequences of a few factors that futurists deem to have un-proportional effect on the future. By using trend analysis as a basis, it is possible to weave a holistic security strategy that utilizes all of the instruments of power as a coherent whole. It is also easy to identify the underlying assumptions and thereby keep track of them. When they change, the strategy may need some adjusting if it is not robust enough or if the deviations from the assumptions are great enough. The strategy should also be easy to explain to the nation and to other states in the world. After all, predictability is important to the reduction of the security dilemma.

By using Sweden as a case study, the paper has relevance to arguably all states inclined to formulate a national security strategy. It seeks to demonstrate a method on which it is possible to form the robust pillars of a national security policy by using future trend analysis as foundation. Furthermore, the paper illustrates those characteristics that inform a small state's perspective in national strategy making.

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